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Environmental inspection agencies have limited resources. A natural response to this 
shortage of resources is targeting. The agency will inspect the firms it suspects to be 
noncompliant. This targeting policy leads to higher compliance than random inspections. 
This paper uses individual inspection data on the timing policy of the environmental 
agency. We focus on the probability that firms in the textile industry in Flanders 
(Belgium) will be inspected by the environmental inspection agency at a particular 
moment in time given that the firm was not inspected for t periods prior to that moment. 
We use a survival model to show that the environmental agency inspects firms in a non-
random way and investigate the factors that influence the probability of inspection. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Environmental inspection agencies have limited resources. On a regular basis we find 
pleas for more funds and more staff in the media. Within their given budget it is 
impossible for the environmental agency to inspect all firms on a regular basis. A natural 
response to this shortage of resources is targeting. The agency will inspect those firms it 
suspects of being noncompliant with the environmental rules or firms that are major 
polluters. This targeting policy leads to higher compliance with regulations than random 
inspections of firms. 
One of the first to address this targeting approach of environmental inspections was 
Harrington (1988). He shows how an enforcement agency can enhance deterrence by 
dividing regulated firms into two groups according to their past compliance record. The 
firms are divided into what Harrington labels ‘good’ firms and ‘bad’ firms. The 
environmental agency devotes most of its resources to inspect the firms in the target group 
or ‘bad’ group. Therefore, bad firms comply because they wish to be found compliant 
during an inspection and return to the good firm category. By contrast, good firms can 
afford to violate the rules because they are infrequently monitored and face low expected 
penalties. As Friesen (2003) puts it, “the ‘stick’ of stricter enforcement and the ‘carrot’ 
for compliance combine to make stronger incentives to comply than a simple random 
auditing framework”. Subsequent papers have considered the robustness of Harrington’s 
results under asymmetric information (Raymond, 1999), the social optimality implications 
(Harford, 1991 and Harford and Harrington, 1991), and alternative explanations for high 
compliance rates such as self-reporting (Livernois and McKenna, 1999) and regulatory 
dealing (Heyes and Rickman, 1999). 
Several empirical papers have estimated the link between past compliance and expected 
inspections and looked for evidence of targeting. Gray and Deily (1996), for example, use 
data on individual steel plants to study the relationship between regulator’s enforcement of 
air pollution regulations and firms’ compliance decisions in the United States. They find 
that compliance behaviour influenced enforcement decisions. Steel plants anticipated to be 
in compliance faced less enforcement, measured either by total enforcement actions or by 
inspections. Moreover, regulators directed less pressure toward plants expected to close   3
and toward plants in attainment areas, while exerting more pressure on plants producing 
large absolute amounts of pollution, irrespective of their compliance status.  
Helland (1998) also provides empirical evidence on the role of targeting in regulatory 
compliance. He finds that targeting produces more cooperation, in the form of self-
reporting, although it does not deter violations. What targeting does, is encourage pulp and 
paper firms in the US to report violations they detect and presumably take steps to correct 
them. However, the author concludes that “targeting does little to speed up compliance 
and is hindered by political factors”. 
The use of inspections and warnings to enforce environmental regulations is examined by 
Eckert (2004). The author finds evidence that past warnings increase the probability of an 
inspection relative to a past finding of non-compliance and that the probability of an 
inspection decreases with the probability of a violation. Moreover, the paper shows that 
warnings are used to group Canadian petroleum storage sites according to their 
compliance history. Warnings can be used as a targeting device and can, therefore, deter 
future violations through the threat of stronger enforcement.  
These empirical papers, however, all use quarterly and, therefore, aggregated data. We 
state that a substantial amount of information is lost this way. Therefore, we analyse 
individual inspection data and focus on the length of time that firms in the textile industry 
in Flanders (Belgium) have to wait before they are inspected by the environmental 
inspection agency. Given that a firm has not been inspected for t periods, what is the 
probability that it will be inspected in the next interval of time? If the agency adopts a 
targeting approach, we can expect the probability that a targeted firm is inspected in the 
next period to be higher than for a non-targeted firm. We use a survival model
2 to 
determine whether firms are inspected in a non-random way and to investigate which 
aspects influence the probability of inspection. Survival or duration analysis was initially 
developed to analyse medical data on the duration of life. Over time the applications range 
                                                      
2 Survival analysis was used previously by Nadeau (1997) to model the EPA’s effectiveness at reducing the 
duration of plant-level non-compliance. The results of this paper indicate that the EPA is effective at 
reducing the non-compliance period of pulp and paper plants. Moreover, Nadeau also shows that the EPA 
follows separate enforcement strategies based on compliance status; i.e. the EPA uses a targeting approach. 
However, inspections were estimated as a Poisson process based on quarterly data. 
   4
much more widely. Examples include the lifetimes of machine components in industrial 
reliability, the duration of strikes or periods of unemployment in economics, the lengths of 
tracks on a photographic plate in particle physics and the survival time of patients in a 
clinical trial (Cox and Oakes, 1984).   
 
2. MODEL 
2.1 State-dependent enforcement or targeting 
The traditional approach on environmental enforcement, derived from Becker (1968), is 
static. It assumes that a regulator chooses the optimal penalty and probability of inspection 
for the current period. This implies that a firm will comply with regulation if the cost of 
doing so is smaller than the expected fine. Thus, increasing the compliance level requires 
an increase in either the probability of inspection or in the penalty. 
Harrington (1988) brings dynamic considerations into the picture and finds that there 
exists an equilibrium where firms have an incentive to comply with regulations despite the 
fact that the costs of compliance each period is greater than the expected penalty. As 
mentioned before, the author divides the firms into two groups on the basis of the firms’ 
past compliance history. In empirical studies this has been translated as targeting that 
occurs based on the compliance status in the last quarter(s) (see, for example, Stafford 
(2002)) or on the predicted compliance status of the firm (see, for example, Gray and 
Deily (1996) or Laplante and Rilstone (1996)). Helland (1998) claims that firms use self-
reporting as a costly signal to move from the bad group to the good group. Eckert (2004) 
shows that the agency uses warnings as a way of targeting firms. However, Friesen (2003) 
derives the optimal targeting scheme in Harrington’s theoretical framework and finds that 
firms should be moved at random into the targeting group. Escape from the target group 
occurs only when an inspection reveals the firm is in compliance. 
In this model we empirically test whether the Flemish environmental inspection agency 
(AMI) targets textile firms. Do some firms have a higher probability of being inspected? 
We investigate which firm characteristics make it more likely that a firm will be inspected. 
We test several possible variables: compliance status during the previous inspection or 
during the previous year, was there a notice of violation issued during the previous   5
inspection/year, was there a warning issued during the previous inspection/year or did the 
inspection agency receive a complaint during the previous quarter/year. In the next section 
we situate the Flemish environmental agency. Afterwards we discuss in detail the factors 
we expect to influence the agency’s inspection decision and the firm’s compliance 
decision. 
 
2.2 Flemish environmental inspection agency 
The Flemish environmental inspection agency (‘Afdeling Milieu-Inspectie’ or AMI) is 
part of the Ministry of the Flemish Region
3. Its main objective is inspecting and 
sanctioning polluters in order to improve environmental quality. The agency has several 
means at its disposal to fulfil this goal. These include several types of monitoring 
activities: routine inspections, reactive inspections and regulatory projects. Routine 
inspections involve, for instance, routine sampling of waste water, camera inspections of 
sewers, checking special conditions in the firm’s environmental permit, ad hoc sound 
measurements and routine sampling of soil and solid waste. Reactive inspections are 
responses to complaints, calamities, questions of the public prosecutor, parliamentary 
questions and demands for advice. The regulatory projects are specific monitoring and 
enforcement campaigns, which are both well-defined in time and in content. They focus 
on sectors, on problem companies or on a specific pollutant or medium. The AMI planned, 
among others, the following projects in 2002: integrated control of textile improvement 
firms, control on the use of ozone depleting substances, emission measurements of 
burning timber waste and a quality control of acoustic investigations.  
Finally, the environmental agency can also use enforcement instruments to protect the 
environment. It can issue advices, warnings or notices of violations
4. An advice is given to 
recommend the firm to make sure that the present situation of compliance with regulations 
continues in the future. A warning, on the other hand, is provided to instruct the firm to 
end the present situation of non-compliance and abide with all appropriate laws, decrees 
                                                      
3 Belgium as a federal state consists of three regions: Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels Capital. 
4 The use and definitions of these enforcement instruments can be found in art. 30 of the Environmental 
Permit Decree and art. 64 of Vlarem I.   6
and permits. A notice of violation
5 formally documents a violation and can be used as 
evidence in a court of law unless the opposite is proven. A copy of this notice of violation 
is send to the Public Prosecutor. Moreover, the agency can also use administrative 
sanctions, such as making a motivated proposal to the administration in power to suspend 
or withdraw the firm’s environmental permit.  
 
2.3 Inspection decision 
We concentrate on water pollution and look at a uniform emission standard, which allows 
firms to emit no more than e . We assume that all violations are intentional. There are no 
accidental violations
6. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to costs; θ is a firm-specific, 
privately observed abatement cost heterogeneity parameter with a continuous distribution 
g(θ) between 0 and ∞. 
The environmental inspection agency randomly inspects a fixed number of firms per year. 
This fixed probability of inspection is denoted by  t p . We further assume that the 
inspection agency receives an imperfect signal rit of the emissions eit at time t (Heyes, 
2002). This signal can be the aggregate measure of complaints, the firm’s compliance 
history or accidental observations. The signal rit follows a distribution that is single-
peaked at eit with an associated cumulative R(rt|eit,Hit) with Hit a set of exogenous factors, 
which can be measured in a plant-specific way. The agency audits a firm if the signal rit is 
larger than Λt. Therefore, the probability of an inspection for firm i at time t is 
  ( ) 1, it t t it it pp R e H   =+ −Λ  . 
The signal rt can be used to divide firms into two groups depending on the trigger Λt. If 
it t r ≤Λ, then the firm belongs to the non-target or ‘good’ group and faces an inspection 
                                                      
5 Internal regulations of AMI state that the civil servants do not always have to issue a notice of violation 
when violations are discovered. They have the power to evaluate the situation and use their professional 
competences to decide on the level of precaution and care displayed by the firm. However, a warning will 
always be send to the firm if a violation was detected. 
6 Accidental violations will not affect the model as long as they are white noise.   7
frequency  it t p p = . If  it t r >Λ, then the firm is placed in the target or ‘bad’ group and is 
inspected with probability  ( ) 1, it t t it it pp R e H   =+ −Λ  . 
The agency minimises total environmental damages plus weighted enforcement costs. 
Principally the agency cares about the environmental damage. The enforcement costs are 
weighted with η the internal marginal cost of expenditure on enforcement (cf. Heyes, 
2002). This weight captures the marginal productivity of agency spending in other uses, 
such as, enforcement programs other than that featured in the model or information 
programs aimed at firms to point out abatement possibilities and reduce discharges. 
The environmental agency has two decision variables: the fixed sampling inspection 
frequency  t p  and the trigger Λt. The objective function of the agency at time t is: 
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with h(eit) the distribution of the harm caused by emissions, 
*
it e  the firm’s optimal amount 
of emissions at time t and cI the cost of an inspection.  
The first order conditions for the fixed inspection frequency  t p  and the trigger Λt, which 
determine the variable inspection frequency, are: 
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We obtain the familiar result that the agency will invest in inspections as long as the 
benefits outweigh the costs. The increase in the probability of an inspection encourages 
firms to abate more and to emit less. This implies that the expected environmental harm 
will decrease. The number of firms with a signal rit higher than the trigger will decrease 
and the frequency of variable inspections will be smaller.   8
For purposes of estimation, the set of exogenous factors Hit and the components of the 
signal rit are important. In the next two sessions we describe different factors that can be 
included in rit and Hit and investigate how these elements influence the inspection decision 
of the environmental agency. In line with the empirical and econometric analysis we focus 
on the textile industry in Flanders.  
 
Components of the signal rit 
The signal is a vector of factors that are not controlled by the firm in the short run. 
However, they can be changed in the long run. We distinguish several components: the 
type of firm, the processes used, the number of complaints received, the compliance 
history and the discharge medium. We discuss these factors in turn.  
Firstly, the firms in our sample belong to two subsectors of the textile industry: textile 
improvement and carpet production. We can expect to see a difference between the two 
types of firms. The average composition of the waste water discharged by the two sectors 
(see appendix A) shows that, overall, carpet production tends to be dirtier than textile 
improvement. It would be reasonable that the environmental agency focuses on the dirtier 
firms since they can be expected to increase the marginal benefits to the environmental 
agency
7. Increasing compliance at those firms will have a higher impact on the 
environmental quality. The type of processes used by the firms can also influence the level 
of emissions. Fibre treatment divisions are potentially dirtier while spinning processes are 
cleaner. Another factor that is closely related to the processes used is the average amount 
of water used per kilogram of finished textile. The environmental inspection agency might 
find it beneficial to inspect those firms that emit large amounts of waste water.  
The number of complaints by neighbours or concerned parties is also relevant for the 
inspection agency. Often these complaints give an indication of potential environmental 
violations. The expected returns for the agency of following up on these complaints and 
visiting the accused firms can thought to be higher than the returns on random inspections. 
Indeed, internal regulations of the Flemish inspection agency state that complaints must be 
followed by a site visit within three months. 
                                                      
7 In this model the environmental inspection agency does not take the compliance costs of firms into 
account. Its goal is not an efficient allocation of the abatement costs but minimising environmental damages.    9
The history of a firm’s compliance is also of concern to the environmental agency. The 
agency can perceive the benefits of targeting firms with a poor compliance history to 
outweigh any increase in costs. As mentioned in the introduction, empirical evidence
8 has 
already shown that environmental inspection agencies (in US and Canada) often target 
firms based on their compliance history.  
Finally, it will also be important whether the firms discharge in the sewers or in surface 
waters (directly or indirectly). Since the effluent disposed in the sewers is carried to water 
treatment plants, the environmental agency can find it beneficial to target firms that 
discharge in surface waters. The impact on environmental quality is possibly greater. 
 
Exogenous factors 
The exogenous factors included in Hit are: the size of the firm, the region and regulatory 
projects. 
The size of the firm is also an important factor. This is measured by the turnover.  Larger 
firms potentially produce more pollution and are a likely target for the inspection agency. 
However, they might be more complex and thus more costly to inspect. Moreover, large 
firms are usually better informed and have more resources to spend on abatement. The 
influence of firm size on inspection frequency is, therefore, ambiguous. 
The province in which the firms are located can affect the agency’s activity level. The 
provincial offices of the Flemish Environmental Agency (AMI) are sufficiently 
independent to allow some provinces to monitor and enforce more stringently than others, 
even though AMI strives to maintain a uniform enforcement policy throughout the 
Flemish Region. Historically most of the Flemish textile industry has always been located 
in East and West Flanders. The firms included in our sample are situated in West Flanders 
(21), East Flanders (18) and Limburg (2). 
The inspection agency yearly decides to implement some specific regulatory projects. For 
example, the project P216 ‘Integrated audit of textile improvement companies’, realised in 
                                                      
8 See, for example, Gray and Deily (1996), Nadeau (1997), Helland (1998) and Eckert (2004).   10
2002, allowed us to collect our data. During the course of such a project the firms under 
consideration are inspected more frequently and more thoroughly (see appendix B). 
 
2.4  Compliance decision 
Firms minimise their expected costs at time t. This gives, for each firm i: 
  () ( ) min , ( );
it
ii t i t i t i t i t e ce F p fe e S θ +−  
With  () ii t ce θ   = cost to comply with emission standard  
i θ   = a firm-specific, privately observed cost heterogeneity  
parameter with a continuous distribution g(θ) between 0 and ∞ 
() . it F   = expected penalty function for firm i at time t, which increases 
with the probability of inspection and the fine 
() it it f ee −   = the fine of an emission violation is an increasing function of the 
size of the violation 
Sit  = set of exogenous factors 
The first order condition for the firm’s emissions is (cf. Sandmo, 2002) 
  () ( )
'' ,( ) ; ii t i t i t i t i t ce F p fe eS θ −= − . 
This is the condition for an interior solution. For it to be the optimum the following 









θ = −> . 
We denote the optimal amount of emissions by  ( )
* ,,; it t t it it ep fS Λ . 
For purposes of estimation, the set of exogenous factors S it is important. Again we 
concentrate on the textile industry and discuss in the next section the exogenous factors 
that influence the compliance decisions of the firm. We also predict the signs we can 
expect in the empirical exercise.   11
Exogenous factors 
The number of inspections in the firm under consideration in the previous year can 
influence the compliance status of the firm. On the one hand, if recently inspected, firms 
can expect fewer inspections over the next period. Therefore, they would be less likely to 
comply. On the other hand, assuming the agency focuses on past violators, firms that were 
recently caught could expect more inspections in the future. This would imply that they 
are more likely to comply. 
Moreover, the compliance decision of the firm also depends on the regulatory projects 
performed by inspection agency. These projects often include more stringent and thorough 
inspections. Therefore, the agency is more likely to find violations. For instance, most 
textile companies in the sample could not show the necessary fire safety reports when 
asked during the P216-inspections and several of firms needed minor adaptations of their 
environmental permit to reflect reality better.  
Compliance with the emission limits described in the environmental permit (the original 
one or modification permits) is checked by the environmental agency if these conditions 
differ from the ones stated in the regulations. Firms know this and expect an inspection if 
they renew their environmental permit. Consequently, they will try to comply better. 
The Flemish Environmental Agency (‘Vlaamse MilieuMaatschappij’ or VMM) regularly 
measures firms’ emissions in order to determine the effluent taxes the firm need to pay. 
Firms know that the inspection agency could drop by if the Flemish environmental agency 
comes to measure emissions. AMI regularly checks the seals on the sampling equipment 
and ascertains that no fraud occurs. Firms will, therefore, be more likely to comply
9. 
The two types of firm, textile improvement and carpet production, can also have different 
compliance behaviour. Compliance can depend on the types of divisions present. Dirtier 
                                                      
9 The inspections performed by AMI can have an impact on compliance with measurement regulations. 
Moreover, we can expect to find less visible signs (such as oil spills or improperly stored chemicals) of 
possible environmental violations. Compliance with the emission norms for waste water will, however, not 
be greatly enhanced by these inspections.   12
firms, for instance, those including a finishing
10 department, are less likely to comply. 
Firms that use lots of water are potentially larger violators
11. 
Some firms employ an environmental coordinator. This coordinator is assumed to have a 
more complete grasp on the environmental situation of the firm. He/she gathers 
information about the composition and size of the firm’s emissions, the processes and the 
abatement possibilities. This implies that firms with an environmental coordinator should 
violate less. 
Next the way of waste disposal, discharge in sewers versus discharge in surface waters, 
can have an influence on the firm’s compliance decision. Maybe the attitude of firms is 
more relaxed if they know their waste water will be treated again in a purification station. 
Large firms (turnover) have more resources to invest in abatement. Moreover, they can 
experience economies of scale in emission reduction. This leads us to anticipate larger 
firms to comply more. However, larger firms usually emit more and the production 
processes can be quite complex. They can also devote more resources to lobbying and 
even corruption. This would lead to less compliance.  
Finally, it is possible that firms in a particular province are more or less compliant than in 
other provinces.  
 
3. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
Survival analysis is used to make inferences about the length of time between two 
environmental inspections. In a survival model we estimate the probability of remaining in 
a particular state for t periods. In this paper we are looking at the probability that a firm is 
inspected by the environmental agency at time t, given that it has not been inspected for t 
periods. This method allows us to make assumptions about how factors, such as past 
                                                      
10 In a finishing department the final treatment of the textile occurs such as making it fire resistant or moth 
resistant. These treatments involve quite a lot of chemicals. 
11 The textile firms cannot use this water to dilute their waste water since the relevant regulations (art. 
5.3.2.4 §3 of Vlarem II) state that the emission limits are linked to a reference volume of waste water (see 
appendix 5.3.2 of Vlarem II).   13
compliance behaviour, affect the probability of being inspected. If the firm’s past 
compliance behaviour significantly increases the audit probability, we can say that the 
agency uses targeting to select firms for an environmental audit. 
Let the spell length, or the time between two inspections, be represented by the random 
variable T. Suppose that T has a continuous distribution f(t) and cumulative F(t), where t is 
a realisation of T.  
The probability that the spell is of length t or larger is given by the survival function 
  () ( ) ( ) 1 S t F t prob T t =− = ≥ . 
Next we consider the hazard rate 





λ = . 
Roughly, the hazard rate is the rate at which spells are completed after duration t, given 
that they last at least until t. In our model the hazard rate represents the probability with 
which firms are inspected after not being inspected for t periods.  
We follow Cox’s (1972) approach to the proportional hazard model
12 to analyse the effect 
of covariates on the hazard rate. The model (this exposition is based on Greene, 2000) 
specifies that 






− = . 
The function  0 λ  is the ‘baseline’ hazard, which is the individual heterogeneity. In 
principle, this hazard is a parameter for each observation that must be estimated. Let x be a 
set of regressors
13 that explain the length of time until inspection. These equal the set of 
exogenous factors Hit and the determinants of the signal rit described in section II.2. 
                                                      
12 For a more detailed exposition on proportional hazard models see Cox and Oakes (1984) or Lancaster 
(1990). 
13 Regressors or covariates are naturally introduced as conditioning variables in the hazard. This poses no 
problem even when the covariates are endogenously time-varying, as long as the hazard at t is conditioned 
only on variables that are known at t. The situation where some of the explanatory variables depend on time,   14
Cox’s partial likelihood estimator provides a method of estimating β without requiring 
estimation of  0 λ . Suppose that the sample contains K distinct exit or inspection times, 
T1,…, TK. For any time Ti, the risk set, denoted Ri, consists of all firms whose exit time is 
at least Ti. The risk set is defined with respect to any moment in time T as the set of firms 
who have not yet been inspected just prior to that time. For every firm j in risk set Ri we 
have,  ji tT ≥ . The probability that a firm is inspected at time Ti, given that exactly one firm 
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. 
Thus, the conditioning sweeps out the baseline hazard functions. For the simplest case in 
which exactly one firm is audited at each distinct exit time and there are no censored 

















  ∑∑ . 
If mi firms are inspected at time ti, then the contribution to the log-likelihood is the sum of 

















  ∑∑ ∑ . 
A potential problem occurs since the inspection agency and the firms can be viewed as 
making decisions about enforcement and compliance simultaneously. If not accounted for, 
this may bias the results of the estimations. We assume that the firms only review their 
compliance status after an inspection has taken place. In the interval between inspections 
this compliance status is assumed to stay constant. Moreover, since we do not work with 
aggregated data, simultaneity is not an issue. We can estimate the compliance function of 
the firm and the inspection function separately. 
                                                                                                                                                                
implies that the hazard ratio is no longer constant over time. The model is no longer a proportional hazard 
model and will be referred to as a Cox regression model.   15
Since we want to investigate which target variable the inspection agency uses, we also 
estimate the compliance function of the firm. Firm compliance is estimated by using a 
probit model. Greene (2000) provides a thorough discussion on how to specify and 
estimate probit models. The predicted compliance values obtained by this estimation are 
then used as an instrumental variable for observed past compliance in the survival model. 




First we describe the dataset we use for the empirical analysis and illustrate some 
interesting findings. Next some descriptive statistics are given. 
 
4.1 Description of the data set 
During the summer of 2003 we collected data gathered by the Flemish environmental 
inspection agency. Within the framework of internal project P216 the AMI performed a 
complete environmental audit of forty-one textile improvement and carpet production 
companies. The database contains information about 1800 inspections completed by the 
environmental inspection agency between 1991 and 2003. Per inspection we gathered data 
on its characteristics (type, cause and timing) and on its results (violations and 
enforcement actions).  
Two third of the inspections were water related. Water pollution is indeed the main 
environmental problem for textile companies. We also looked at the cause of the 
inspection (see figure 1) as stated on the administrative inspection report. The largest part 
of the inspections was dedicated to take routine water samples. Also during the project 
P216 ‘Integrated audit of textile improvement companies’ several inspections were 
performed. These inspections, which often included water samples, account for 15 % of 
all inspections included in the database. The project started in 2001 and ended in 2003. 
Moreover, AMI often receives complaints about firms included in the sample. It is 
standard policy to follow-up on these complaints within three months and to pay the firm 
in question a visit. In our sample 13 % of the inspections were triggered by complaints.   16
Furthermore the administration inspected firms to follow-up on advices and warnings (7 
%). Finally, some inspections (7%) were performed following a request of the 























Figure 1 : Causes of inspections 
These different types of inspections do not all require the same amount of time. In 
appendix B we summarise the average duration of an inspection per type. These averages 
include the time needed to get to the site and back to the office as well as the actual time 
spend on the firms’ premises. Inspections performed to follow-up on VMM measurements 
and to take routine water samples take just under an hour of the inspectors’ time on 
average. The duration of inspections executed as part of the P216 project, on the other 
hand, is twice as long. These inspections, as we already mentioned are more thorough. 
Overall, an inspection took on average 77 minutes.  
Next we consider the number of inspections performed per year (see figure 2). The peak in 
2002 is clearly due to the project P216. The smaller number of inspections before 1995 is 
no reflection of reality. For several firms the files were no longer complete. Moreover, in 
those days the agency did not yet keep its records in an electronic format. Finally, we may 
                                                      
14 Since all inspections are actually performed in their official capacity, AMI has stopped using this 
terminology. Same goes for the ‘HID’ inspections.   17
not forget that the environmental inspection agency (AMI) was only founded in 1991
15 





























































Figure 2: Number of inspections per year and compliance status 
We now look at the compliance status of the firms during the inspections. We found that 
over the years at least 25 % (1992) and at most 66 % (1999) of the firms were compliant. 
Over the complete database we found that 47 % of the firms were found to be compliant 
during an inspection.  
The violations that were detected include: missing documents such as maintenance reports 
or fire safety reports, incomplete or missing exploitation license, violations of emission 
standards for one or more water pollutants, air pollution (gases, smoke and/or bad smell), 
oil spills and the inaccessibility of the measuring point. 
We also look, in figure 3, at the enforcement actions taken after or during an inspection 
which found a firm in violation. Firstly, we would like to point out that in spite of the 
many violations we did not encounter administrative sanctions. AMI, for instance, did not 
                                                      
15 Before 1991 only one administration was responsible for both issuing permits and enforcement. Most of 
its resources, however, were used to deal with permit requests or with modifying them and not with 
monitoring and enforcement.   18
send any motivated proposals to the administration in power to suspend or withdraw the 

































































Notice of Violation warning advice no action
 
Figure 3: Enforcement action taken after inspection with detected violation 
After detecting a violation the inspection agency took some type of enforcement action in 
20 to 30 % of the cases. This does not mean that the agency only reacts to 20 or 30 % of 
total violations. After all, it might take several visits – during which the firm is in violation 
– to formally prove the violations. For example: 
  Visit 1: water sample 1 taken 
Visit 2: results sample 1 discussed: one or more parameters indicate a violation of 
less than 100 % and therefore a second water sample
16 is taken 
Visit 3: results of sample 2 are discussed: violation of one or more parameters is 
confirmed ⇒ notice of violation and warning are issued 
                                                      
16 The exact requirements under which such a second sample is necessary can be found in art.4.2.6.1 of 
Vlarem II.   19
Also it is quite plausible that after the notice of violation (NOV) accompanied by a 
warning has been issued, the firm’s violation will continue for quite some time. After all, 
it often takes time to comply. Requesting a new or extended license can take months. 
Building a new water purification station can even take years. During this period the 
agency is likely to pay some follow-up visits. During these visits they find the firm in 


















2 7165  Euro
First instance 15  2869 Euro
Settlement 16 260  Euro
Info 69
Dismissal 36  0
NOV 140
No info  71    
Warning 38       0
Advice 21       0
709 
No action  510         0
Table 1 : Enforcement of noncompliant firms 
In table 1 we analyse what happens after an inspection that found a firm in violation. As 
mentioned above, in the majority (72 %) of the cases no enforcement action was taken. 
We concentrate on the notices of violations that are issued since a copy of those is always 
sent to the Public Prosecutor in order to start legal prosecution. These violations can 
potentially lead to monetary penalties.  
We find that in our sample only 25 percent of the cases (17 out of 69) are actually brought 
to trial. In 23 percent of the cases (16 out of 69) a settlement is negotiated and the 
remaining cases (52%) are dismissed without further consequences. Looking at the 
average monetary penalty, we see that the average settlement amount is 260 Euro, the 
average fine at the first instance is 2869 Euro and the average fine at the Court of Appeal 
                                                      
17 We process here the information received by AMI on the follow-up on NOVs by the Prosecutor’s Office.   20
is 7165 Euro. The monetary penalty for violating environmental regulations in Flanders is 
apparently limited. There must be other motivations for firms to comply with 
environmental policies. Firstly, firms also have to pay taxes, an effluent fee, depending on 
the concentrations of pollutants in their waste water. Secondly, textile firms have sizeable 
incentives to recycle their waste water and to minimise water use during production. 
These incentives are generated by the tightening of the Flemish groundwater policy. Firms 
are only allowed to pump up limited amounts (specified in their permit) of groundwater 
and they have to pay an annual groundwater tax for the water they use. Finally, it is 
possible that firms are complying in order to avoid bad publicity or because the firm 
culture is an ethical and environment-friendly one.  
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
In table 2 the different variables used in the estimations are defined. Moreover, we give 
the expected signs for each of the variables. These expectations are based on the analysis 
performed in section II.3 and II.4. 
 





COMPLIANT   = 1 if firm was compliant at 
inspection 
0.554   
DURATION  Days between two inspections  93.380    
YEAR2002  Dummy for year 2002  0.136 n/a  + 
INSPYEAR  Number of inspections in 
previous year 
4.965 ? + 
COMPLAINT  Dummy if a complaint was 
issued against firm 
0.145 n/a + 
P216  Dummy for regulatory project  0.115 -  n/a 
PERMIT  Dummy if conditions in permit 
needed testing 
0.041 + n/a 
VMM  Dummy if measurements by 
VMM needed checking 
0.045 + n/a 
COMP1  = 1 if firm was compliant one 
inspection ago 
0.553 + -   21
COMP2  = 1 if firm was compliant two 
inspections ago 
0.551 + - 
COMP3  = 1 if firm was compliant three 
inspections ago 
0.551 +? -? 
COMP4  = 1 if firm was compliant four 
inspections ago 
0.551 +? -? 
WARNING1  = 1 if agency issued a warning 
one inspection ago 
0.021 + + 
NOV1  = 1 if agency issued NOV one 
inspection ago 
0.094 + + 
NOV2  = 1 if agency issued NOV two 
inspections ago 
0.094 + +? 
ADVICE1  = 1 if agency gave an advice 
one inspection ago 
0.014 + + 
IMPROVE  Dummy for independent textile 
improvement firms 
0.425 + n/a 
INTEGRATED  Dummy for integrated textile 
improvement firms 
0.455 + n/a 
FIBRE  Dummy for fibre division  0.085 n/a  + 
SPINNING  Dummy for spinning division  0.185 n/a  - 
FINISH  Dummy for finishing division  0.746 -  n/a 
COORDINATOR  Dummy for environmental 
coordinator  
0.755 + n/a 
SURFACE  Dummy for discharge in surface 
waters 
0.380 + + 
USE  Water use per kg of treated 
textile 
53.205 ? ? 
TURNOVER Firm  turnover  71005 ?  ? 
WEST 
FLANDERS 
Dummy for West Flanders  0.473 ?  ? 
n/a : not applicable 
Table 2 : Descriptive statistics and expected signs 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Compliance function 
Using a probit model we estimate the compliance decision by the firm. The results are 
given in table 3. The results are as expected. Firms anticipate the environmental inspection   22
if the VMM takes samples of the waste water and are more likely to comply if the 
inspection was performed to check on the VMM measurements
18. A firm that was 
compliant during the last period is more likely to be compliant in the current period.  The 
firms’ compliance status seems to be persistent over time. Moreover, the enforcement 
actions taken by the agency have the desired effect. Issuing a notice of violation or an 
advice encourages firms to act in accordance with environmental regulations. The 
presence of an environmental coordinator also has the effect desired by the regulator and 
induces firms to comply with the rules. Finally, firms, which use more water during their 
production processes, can more easily dilute their waste water and this leads to less firms 
found in violation.   
 
   Coefficient  P-value 
Constant -0.368 0.2554
INSPYEAR -0.0039 0.7809
P216 *** -0.520 0.0004
PERMIT *** -0.718 0.0024
VMM *** 0.751 0.0041
COMP1 *** 0.960 0.0000




NOV1 * 0.373 0.0607
NOV2 0.230 0.2706
ADVICE1 * 0.633 0.0795
IMPROVE *** -0.726 0.0000
INTEGRATED -0.236 0.1207
FINISH *** -0.412 0.0090
COORDINATOR ** 0.304 0.0380
SURFACE 0.162 0.2622
USE ** 0.0043 0.0222
                                                      





Log likelihood function = -434.98 
Restricted log likelihood = -547.21 
Number of observations = 800 
*** / ** / * = significant at 1% / 5% / 10% level 
Table 3 : Results for compliance function 
We now look at the factors that make it more likely to find a firm violating the rules 
during an inspection. Again these signs are as expected, except for the variable 
IMPROVE. The fact that independent improvement companies turn out to be less 
compliant in our sample, can be explained by the business environment. These companies 
face severe competition both in Belgium and abroad. This may lead to less attention for 
environmental issues. Inspections performed as part of the project P216 or to check on 
permit requirements seem to be more thorough and, therefore, more likely to find the firm 
in violation with one or more elements of environmental regulations. Moreover, firms that 
own a finishing department are less compliant.  
 
5.2 Inspection function  
We now estimate the probability that a textile firm is inspected after not being inspected 
for t periods (i.e. the hazard rate). The results (see first column of table 4) show that the 
Flemish inspection agency uses targeting to determine the inspections it will perform. 
Some firms have a higher probability of being inspected than others. 
 
   Coefficient p-value Coefficient  p-value
INSPYEAR  *** 0.137 0.0000 *** 0.144  0.0000
YEAR2002   0.128 0.1564 0.139  0.1249
COMP1  *** -0.291 0.0007  
COMP2   -0.092 0.2820  
COMP3  * 0.145 0.0945    24
COMP4   -0.061 0.4466  
WARNING1   -0.289 0.2136 -0.285  0.2186
NOV1  *** -0.531 0.0004 *** -0.427  0.0031
ADVICE1   -0.258 0.3310 -0.088  0.7391
COMPLAINT  ** 0.234 0.0298 0.178  0.1040
FIBRE  ** 0.414 0.0155 ** 0.370  0.0328
SPINNING  *** -0.259 0.0071 ** -0.244  0.0112
SURFACE   -0.084 0.4222 -0.083  0.4302
USE   -0.0009 0.4042 -0.0015  0.1759
TURNOVER   -0.0000006 0.4546 -0.0000006  0.4341
WEST 
FLANDERS 
* -0.145 0.0947 -0.129  0.1691
COMPRED   ** -0.185  0.0210
  Log likelihood function = -4509 
Restricted log likelihood = -4644 
*** = significant at 1% level 
** = significant at 5% level 
* = significant at 10% level 
Log likelihood function = -4426 
Restricted log likelihood = -4557 
*** = significant at 1% level 
** = significant at 5% level 
* = significant at 10% level 
Table 4 : Estimation of probability of inspection 
 
Which are the variables that AMI uses to target its inspections?  
Firstly, the compliance status during the previous inspection (COMP1) influences the 
probability that a firm will be inspected. Firms that were in violation at their previous 
inspection are more likely to be audited. This is compatible with Harrington’s (1988) 
analysis. Secondly, firms will be inspected more quickly if a complaint has been issued. 
Complaints by neighbours, other civil servants or passers-by are always followed up 
within three months. Thirdly, and this is rather surprising, firms that received a notice of 
violation during their last inspection, are less likely to be inspected again. However, a 
closer look at the procedure that starts with a notice of violation clarifies matters. A NOV 
is always accompanied by a warning. In this warning the agency states the precise nature 
of the violation and determines a time period during which the firm has to return to 
compliance. Firms get typically time (three, six, twelve or even more months) to rectify   25
the situation depending on the complexity of the corrective measures needed. Within this 
time frame the environmental agency will not inspect firms to follow up on the violation. 
The violation is, after all, already detected and legal prosecution has been initiated. As 
mentioned in table 2 the average time between two inspections is 93 days or 3 months. 
This explains why we obtain a negative relationship between the probability of being 
inspected and the fact that firms have received a NOV at their previous inspection. 
However, other inspections, such as follow-up on complaints, scans for regulatory projects 
or checking on VMM measurements, will still be effectuated. Contrary to Eckert (2004) 
our coefficient of the variable WARNING1 is not significant. Therefore, we cannot 
comment on the use of warnings as targeting variables. 
 
Other determinants of the hazard rate 
The hazard rate or the probability a firm is inspected will increase: 
-  if the number of inspections in the previous year increase 
-  if the firm owns a fibre treatment division 
Firstly, firms that were already inspected a lot face a higher probability of being audited 
again. This was not the result we expect at first sight. The variable INPSYEAR probably 
picks up some firm characteristics that were not included in the analysis but that influence 
the likelihood of being examined by AMI. Secondly, fibre treatment is a more polluting 
production process. The agency takes this into account by visiting these firms more often.    
The hazard rate will decrease: 
-  if the firm owns a spinning division 
-  if the firm is situation in the region West Flanders 
A spinning division seems to be a cleaner type of production process than the others. The 
inspection agency, therefore, seems to inspect these firms less often. Further, the analysis 
of this particular dataset indicates that firms situated in West Flanders are visited slightly 
less often than firms in other regions. 
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Observed versus predicted compliance 
Next we check whether the probability of an inspection can be better explained by using 
predicted compliance rather than observed compliance during the previous site visit. 
Predicted compliance (COMPRED) was calculated using the probit analysis of section 
V.1. The results in the second column of table 4 show that using predicted compliance 
instead of observed compliance does not change the results much. The signs of all 
coefficients remain unchanged and even the levels are approximately the same. However, 
the significance levels of some estimates change. The coefficient of the region (WEST 
FLANDERS) and the coefficient measuring the effects of complaints (COMPLAINT) 
become insignificant. 
   
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The inspection agency has an important role to play in determining the effectiveness of 
environmental regulations. Using a limited budget, the agency needs to bring as many 
firms into compliance as possible. Research has shown that selecting firms based on past 
behaviour or firm characteristics can greatly increase overall compliance relative to 
randomly inspecting firms. This monitoring policy is called targeting. 
An empirical exercise shows that the Flemish environmental inspection agency (AMI) 
indeed uses targeting to select the textile firms it will inspect. This selection is based on 
past compliance behaviour and on complaints received.  
Moreover, we find that even though enforcement actions have very little monetary 
consequences, they still have deterrence effects. Firms are more likely to comply if they 
received an advice or a notice of violation at their previous inspection. 
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APPENDIX A - Average composition of the effluent emitted by carpet production 
and textile improvement sectors (without treatment) 
 
Parameter  Unit Carpet production Textile improvement 
Daily load  m³ 458 513 
BOD mg/l 744 478 
COD mg/l 2310 1475 
SS mg/l 163 193 
Arsenic  µg/l 0 2 
Silver  µg/l 6 9 
Chromium  µg/l 349 136 
Zinc  µg/l 3488 593 
Copper  µg/l 57 117 
Cadmium  µg/l 3 2 
Lead  µg/l 33 34 
Nickel  µg/l 178 20 
Tot. Nitrogen  mg/l 57 32 
Tot. Phosphorus  mg/l 10 6 
Source: Jacobs et al. (1998) 
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Average duration in 
minutes 
VMM charges  51.37 
Water sample  54.21 
HID 55.32 
Complaint 64.54 
Official capacity  69.21 
Follow-up 79.59 
Judicial question  84.34 
Other 88.44 
Exploitation condition  114.66 
P216 121.93 
Total 76.54 
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